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The  boom  of  world  trade,  the  unprecedented  openness  of  domestic  markets,  regional 
integration, and the persistence and magnitude of globalisation are as many challenges to 
the management of the internal balance between revenues and expenditures, both in the 
context  of  international,  regional,  national,  and  company  mechanisms,  and  for  the 
individual  households  and  consumers.  The  coexistence  of  foreign  deficits/trade  and 
domestic deficits/ budget at macro level, at the same time with the accumulation of high 
levels  of  indebtedness  of  the  states,  non-financial  corporate  entities,  and  individual 
households requires, in the context of the present global financial crisis, new theoretical and 
practical approaches, new institutions, and new policies capable to secure the sustainability 
of growth, and to diminish the risk of increasingly unpredictable disturbances. 
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Romanian people are not prone to thrive on loans and to live in debt. The debt-free culture 
is as old as the hills among Romanians, but this proclivity has taken the form of a clear-cut 
concept particularly during the past two hundred years, since money-lenders and incipient 
banking became fairly common in the Romanian territories. 
Equally old is the still existing biblical belief that financial institutions are "parasites". This 
is  due  to  the  fact  that,  banks  in  Romania  have  never  in  history  been  Romanian,  and 
consequently never took care of depositors’ savings and never tried to save their clients in 
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debt by brokering transactions for them. A proof of this is the fact that, currently, over 90% 
of the capital of the banks operating in Romania is held by foreign shareholders. 
In modern times, the resentment to being indebted was kept alive in the '80 through an 
efforts made of paying off the foreign debt. 
After  1990,  more  and  more  often  an  opinion  favorable  to  indebtedness  was  aired  by 
politicians, and by would-be scientists trying to induce the idea that having debts is an 
advantage rather than a disadvantage in the pursuit of economic growth and if we want to 
“improve our image in the eyes of international financial institutions”. 
As a consequence, Romania’s external deficits have grown almost exponentially within the 
past ten (10) years (1998-2007), with the current account deficit rising from 2.6 billion euro 
to 16.7 billion euro (6.3 times), and accounting for a GDP share that went up from 3.7% in 
2000 to 13.5% in 2007; the trade balance deficit leaped from 3.1 bn euro to 21.8 bn euro 
(6.9 times), its GDP share more than doubling, from 8.4% in 1998 to 17.6% in 2007. 
During the same reference timeframe, the gross domestic product increased from 37.4 bn 
euro to 123.7 bn euro (3.3 times). 
The conclusion is that for every GDP unit added, it takes a doubling of the foreign deficits. 
 
1. About domestic indebtedness 
The net borrowing of the Romanian economy followed a continuously ascending curve 
from 1.3 bn euro in 1998 to 8.07 bn euro in 2006 and 22.1 bn euro in 2007 (Table no. 1); in 
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Table no. 1: Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) by institutional sectors (billion lei, 
current prices) 
   1998  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Total sectors  -1.3  -2.9  -7.8  -10.7  -18.3  -19.1  -24.6  -28.4  -73.7 
Non-financial 
corporations 
sector  -1.7  -8.0  -8.8  -17.7  -25.2  -22.1  -47.4  -16.3  -64.5 




institutions   -0.4  0.5  -1.7  -0.2  -1.1  0.9  -2.4  10.4  -0.8 
Other 
financial 




funds  -0.04  -0.3  0.1  0.2  -0.2  -0.6  0.2  0.03  -1.0 
General 
government  -1.2  -3.5  -4.2  -3.0  -2.9  -2.9  -3.3  -7.6  -10.5 
Households  1.8  8.7  6.9  10.0  9.9  7.7  24.0  -13.6  2.1 
Source: Own calculations based on “Conturile naŃionale financiare 1998-2007”, National 
Bank of Romania, Bucharest, 2008. 
The largest share of such borrowings appears in the ledgers of non-financial corporations 
and of public administration bodies (general government), which, in the reference period, 
accounted for 87.5% and, respectively, 14.3% of total borrowing in the economy. 
Similarly, the annual end loans stock increased from a 21.5 bn euro equivalent in 1998 to 
100.9 bn euro in 2007. The worth of the loans represented 47.5% of the GDP in 2000 and 
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Table no. 2: Loans by institutional sectors (final stock at the end of the year) (billion 
lei, current prices) 
 
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Total 







































total  7.9  13.7  19.4  32.5  39.6  44.0  47.6  46.0  42.1  49.8 
House-
holds  0.5  0.6  0.7  1.1  3.3  10.2  15.4  26.9  46.5  72.8 
Rest of 
the 
world  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.4  0.4  2.5  5.0  10.7 
















in GDP  57.3  50.2  47.5  49.5  51.1  52.4  52.2  58.7  69.0  81.6 
Source: Own calculations based on “Conturile naŃionale financiare 1998-2007”, National 
Bank of Romania, Bucharest, 2008.  
Note: *- under 0.001 
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Table no. 3 shows that the loan structure, too, underwent significant changes: first, of all 
non-government loans, foreign currency loans jumped from only 3% in 1990 to 55% in 
2007; secondly, households loans rose spectacularly from 2.5% in 1998 (except for the 
slight drop to 1.8% in 2000) to 21.6% in 2007, while public administration slowed down 
the loans proportion from some 35% in 2001 to 9.2% in 2007. 
 
Table no. 3: Loans distribution by institutional sectors (end of the year) (%) 
 

























sector  67.5  62.3  61.3  59.3  60.0  56.9  55.5  53.7  50.1  53.0 
National 










loans  22.8  28.8  31.6  34.6  30.6  26.2  23.0  18.5  11.9  9.2 
House-
holds  2.5  2.0  1.8  1.8  4.3  9.8  12.0  15.9  19.5  21.6 
Rest of 
the 
world  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.8  0.4  0.3  1.5  2.1  3.2 
Source: Idem Table no. 2. 
 
2. Sources of debt repayment 
The aggregate worth of loans is generally compared to the gross operating surplus, the 
gross disposable income and the gross domestic product. 
The data entered in the national accounts and the financial national accounts between 1998 
and 2006 reveal that the overall gross operating surplus in the economy almost trebled from 
18.1 bn euro equivalent to 49.6 bn euro, accounting for 48.3% and, respectively, 50.7% of 
the GDP (Table no. 4). In 2006, non-financial corporations accounted for 52.5% of the 
gross operating surplus, and individual households for 41.6%. 
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Table no. 4: Gross operating surplus by institutional sectors (billion lei, current 
prices) 
 
   1998  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Non financial 
corporations 
sector   8.7  13.8  21.6  33.8  46.6  60.4  69.4  91.6 
Households  9.7  21.2  33.3  38.8  43.5  59.5  63.4  72.7 
General 
government  0.1  0.6  1.4  1.7  10.2  7.2  7.5  7.9 
Financial 
corporations  0.2  0.8  2.6  2.2  1.6  2.8  2.5  2.0 
Others  -0.6  -0.8  -1.6  0.1  -0.01  0.8  0.2  0.4 
Total national 
economy  18.1  35.7  57.3  76.6  102.9  130.7  143.0  174.7 
Gross domestic 
product  37.4  80.4  116.8  152.0  197.4  247.4  289.0  344.7 
Source:  “Romanian  Statistical  Yearbook”,  National  Institute  of  Statistics,  Bucharest, 
various  editions  and  “Conturile  naŃionale  financiare  1998-2007”,  National  Bank  of 
Romania, Bucharest, 2008. 
 
During  1998  -  2006,  in  nominal  terms,  the  GDP  increased  9.2  times,  and  the  gross 
operating surplus increased 9.7 times, of which 10.5 times in non-financial corporations, 
and 7.7 times in individual households. 
The place held by non-financial corporations (NFC) (Table no. 5) demonstrates that their 
share of indebtedness in the gross operating surplus (GOS NFC) diminished from 168.8% 
in 2000 to 129.9% in 2006.  
Table no. 5: The financial situation of non-financial corporations (billion lei, current 
prices, %) 
   1998  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Gross value added 
NFC (GVA NFC)  19.7  39.4  57.1  76.6  97.9  122.3  145.4  175.7 
GVA NFC/GDP 
(%)  52.6  49.0  48.9  50.4  49.6  49.4  50.3  51.0 
GOS NFC  8.7  13.8  21.6  33.8  46.6  60.4  69.4  91.6 
GOS NFC/GOS 
total (%)  48.2  38.8  37.7  44.1  45.7  46.2  48.5  52.5 
Loans NFC  14.5  23.4  34.3  46.6  58.9  71.7  91.1  119.1 
Loans NFC/Loans 
total (%)  67.5  61.3  59.3  60.0  56.9  55.5  53.7  50.1 
Loans NFC/GOS 
NFC (%)  166.2  168.8  159.1  138.0  126.4  118.6  131.2  129.9 
Source: Idem Table no. 4.  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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The ratio between their loans and the gross value added (GVA NFC) stood at 73.5% in 
1998 and at 67.8% in 2006. 
For  households  (H)  borrowers,  the  ratio  between  the  worth  of  the  loans  and  the  gross 
operating surplus was 5.6% in 1998, 3.2% in 2000, 42.5% in 2005 and 63.9% in 2006 
(Table no. 6). 
Table no. 6: The financial situation of the households (billion lei, current prices, %) 
   1998  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Households gross 
disposable income 
(H GDI)  25.8  58.7  82.5  101.7  116.5  156.3  176.7  204.4 
H GDI/ GDP (%)  69.0  72.9  70.6  66.9  59.0  63.2  61.2  59.3 
Households gross 
operating sursplus 
(H GOS)  9.7  21.2  33.3  38.8  43.5  59.5  63.4  72.7 
H GOS/ GOS total 
(%)  53.7  59.5  58.1  50.6  42.7  45.5  44.3  41.6 
Household loans (H 
loans)  0.5  0.7  1.1  3.3  10.2  15.4  26.9  46.5 
H loans/ Loans total 
(%)  2.5  1.8  1.8  4.3  9.8  12.0  15.9  19.5 
H loans/ H GDI (%)  2.1  1.1  1.3  3.3  8.7  9.9  15.2  22.7 
H loans/ H GOS 
(%)  5.6  3.2  3.2  8.6  23.4  25.9  42.5  63.9 
Source: Idem Table no. 4. 
 
The households' loans represented 1.1% of the gross disposable income (H GDI) in 2000, 
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Table no. 7: Households loans and gross disposable money income 
   1998  2000  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
H loans (bn 
lei)  0.5  0.7  3.3  10.2  15.4  26.9  46.5  71.5  99.2 
Total net 
wage yearly 
found (bn lei)  6.7  11.9  20.8  26.7  32.1  40.8  48.5  61.1  73.9 
% H loans 
/Total net 







lei)  12.3  22.8  45.6  55.4  72.6  85.2  98.9  121.1  159.4 
% H loans/ H 
GDMI  4.4  2.9  7.3  18.4  21.3  31.6  47.0  59.1  62.2 
Source: Idem Table no. 4. 
Of total household gross disposable money income, loans accounted for 62.2% in 2008, as 
against only 2.9% in 2000, and exceeded total households net wage revenues 1.34 times in 
2008. 
 
3. Comparative international approach and final remarks 
In  foreign  deficit  matters,  the  trend  that  gained  ground,  particularly  after  1980  was 
deregulation, encouraged by the much acclaimed free movement of goods, services, capital, 
and labour force. 
In  the  recent  decades,  competition  has  actually  meant  the  strive  of  some  countries  to 
monopolise the purchasing power of other countries by massive exports.  
Encouraging exports and  managing the trade deficits  generated the development of the 
theories regarding competitiveness, which, in our view, takes more than just productivity. 
They translate, among other things, in slowing down wage raises in countries where wage 
levels are high, in granting low interest loans to exporting manufacturers, and more or less 
transparent state aid, in dumping practices and foreign exchange policies favouring national 
currencies. 
The world is being more and more divided between 'price makers' and 'market makers' on 
the one hand, and 'price takers' and 'captive economies or markets' on the other. Capturing 
and monopolising the importing countries’ purchasing opportunities especially by targeting 
households resorts to every possible means, starting from advertising labelling and going to 
slogans like 'consumer’s supreme interest and welfare', and to an unprecedented boom of 
consumer loans schemes.  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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As far as Romania is concerned, export and import acquire an additional significance from 
the perspective of its double deficit (foreign/trade deficit and budgetary deficit), which is 
being sanctioned and fuelled both by high interest rates, and by foreign exchange rates 
detrimental to the national currency. 
For the Euro Zone countries and for the USA, the strength and the supremacy of the two 
currencies seem to outweigh productivity. 
What Romania needs is to have economic and trade policies tailored to its specific features, 
and  capable  to  secure  this  country’s  autonomy  in  taking  contra-cyclic  measures  of 
economic relaunch. 
Managing deficits with the aid of a 'triangle marriage' of the three currencies (leu, Euro, 
Dollar) is like walking on a tight rope. 
Consumer credits in lei or Euro, as an incentive to economic growth, may complicate the 
relaunch of domestic competitive economic growth. 
The national supply of goods and services cannot adapt  over the  night to the  frequent 
changes of exchange rates and interest rates, and even less so to the quality and diversity 
requirements. 
Before  thinking  of  export  deals,  Romanian  manufacturers  see  themselves  increasingly 
excluded from their own domestic market; recapturing the national market, which, after all, 
is a component of the global market, may therefore become their main target. 
The Romanian nationals’ purchasing power is low, like their salaries, and this makes it a 
sure 'victim' of cheaper imports. Low salaries mean a modest taxation basis and ever lower 
revenues  to  the  various  budgets,  which  pushes  them  into  deficit.  These  many  types  of 
deficits kindle inflation, keep interest rates high, and bar economic relaunch either way: 
consumer-wise and investment-wise. 
It  is  hard  to  believe  that,  given  the  present  circumstances,  the  Central  Bank  could 
countermand,  through  monetary  policies,  the  various  effects  of  economic  disturbances 
(such as the severe loss of value in some assets, or, conversely, the sky-high growth of asset 
value; the setting of the foreign exchange rates always in relation to the same two reference 
currencies,  each  of  which  is  backed  up  by  scale  economies  and  by  money  supplies 
hundreds  of  times  greater  and  more  powerful;  practicing  domestic  reference  rates 
compatible with the inflation rate and with the economic growth requirements by loans). 
Interest is a lever of productivity that counts more than the wage level or the qualification 
of the labour force. 
The very high interest rates that have persisted in Romania during the past two decades can 
be  considered  the  main  stumble  block  against  modernisation  and  competitiveness  of 
Romanian companies. 
The fixed idea that low salaries can maintain competitiveness is, for many reasons, totally 
unproductive for economic growth. 
It  would  be  mistaken  for  us  to  think  that  the  current  global  financial  crisis  is  a  mere 
accident; it would be much more profitable for us to try to understand and explain why the 
world has become, in the last twenty years, so dependent on borrowing in the attempt to AE  The Global Financial Crisis: Management of Deficits and Debts 
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sustain  a  growth  much  in  excess  of  the  internal  supply  capabilities  of  the  various 
economies. 
Contrary to Say’s Law, this supply did not generate the own demand in those economies; it 
is the supply of others, through prices and consumer credits, that sustains the demand, all 
while widening the gap between the real economy and the financial economy. 
At present, the European Union rests on the antagonistic coexistence of three patterns: 
private indebtedness, hyper competition, and the European social model, all of them being 
called the 'triangle of European incompatibility'
1.  
Under the Maastricht criteria, the indebtedness rate of public administration bodies in all 
EU members may not exceed 60% of the GDP; this has taken the indebtedness rate of 
businesses and individual households off the right course, because they are not controlled 
through convergence criteria.  
Concomitantly,  USA  trade  deficits  and  surplus  in  some  strongly  emerging  economies 
(China, India, South Korea, etc.) continue to exist. 
Speaking  of  deficits  and  debt  management,  of  their  magnitude  and  distribution  by 
institutional sectors, it must be said that economic globalisation leads to unpredictable, and 
often perverse, results and effects. Brokering and recycling the deficits of some and the 
surplus of others  fetches  handsome revenues for the banking and  financial  sectors, but 
plagues the real economy of many countries. 
The much acclaimed concern for the debts of the developing countries slowly but surely 
switched in the past decades towards the concern for the management of the debts of the 
developed countries. 
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Table no. 8: Net lending by countries (as % of GDP) 





Belgium  4.8  3.9  3.4 
Germany  -0.7  3.7  5.2 
Ireland  1.6  -1.3  -4.0 
Greece  -3.9  -8.4  -9.6 
Spain  -1.4  -5.0  -8.1 
France  2.0  -0.8  -2.1 
Italy  1.4  -0.9  -1.9 
Netherlands  4.6  6.8  7.3 
Austria  -1.1  2.5  3.3 
Portugal  -6.4  -6.7  -8.8 
Finland  7.4  7.0  5.9 
Bulgaria  -2.5  -8.0  -15.0 
Czech Rep.  -4.0  -4.4  -2.7 
Denmark  1.4  3.0  2.4 
Latvia  -8.6  -6.6  -8.9 
Hungary  -7.6  -6.9  -5.7 
Poland  -4.1  -2.3  -1.2 
Romania  -4.8  -5.5  -10.3 
Sweden  3.9  6.1  6.3 
United Kingdom   -1.4  -1.9  -3.2 
EU 27  -0.3  -0.6  -1.8 
USA  -2.9  -5.3  -6.1 
Japan  2.3  3.4  3.9 
Source: OCDE, Economic perspective, 1/2008. 
The same table shows Romania’s far from positive evolution.  And yet, Romania’s public 
debt share of the GDP looks better than that of some developed countries (Table no. 9). 
Table no. 9: Government public debt (% in GDP) 
  1996  2000  2005  2007 
Belgium  127.0  107.8  92.1  83.9 
Greece  111.3  103.2  98.8  94.8 
France  58.0  57.3  66.4  63.9 
Italy  120.9  109.2  105.9  104.1 
Romania  …  26.5  16.1  13.1 
USA  73.4  58.2  63.4  … 
Japan  93.9  134.1  164.0  … 
Source: Eurostat and “Conturile naŃionale financiare 1998-2007”, BNR, Bucharest, 2009. 
Note: (…) – no data available. 
On a European scale, Romania’s public debt and aggregate corporate debt are still at a 
sustainable level (Table no. 10). AE  The Global Financial Crisis: Management of Deficits and Debts 
 
Amfiteatru Economic  746 
Table no. 10: Debts in Euro zone and Romania in 2007 (% in GDP) 







Public debt as 
percentage in 
total debt 1/(1+2) 
Belgium  84.9  118  202.9  41.8 
Germany  65.0  125  190  34.2 
Ireland  25.1  218  243.1  10.3 
Greece  93.4  101  194.4  48.0 
Spain  36.2  200  236.2  15.3 
Italy  105  108  213  49.3 
France  64.2  140  204.2  31.4 
Netherlands  46.8  205  251.8  18.6 
Austria  59.9  135  194.9  30.7 
Portugal  64.4  200  264.4  24.3 
Finland  35.3  118  153.3  23.0 
Average Euro 
zone 
61.8  151.6  213.4  28.9 
Romania  13.1  43.2  56.3  23.3 
Source: Jöel Bourdin, Yvon Collin, 'Rapport d`information no. 342', Sénat France, 8 avril 
2009 and 'Conturile naŃionale financiare 1998-2007', BNR, Bucharest, 2009. 
 
In the time span 1999 – 2007, the ratio between corporate debt and the gross operating 
surplus  in  the  euro  zone  rose  from  about  280%  to  approximately  390%,  and  the  ratio 
between corporate debt and the GDP followed an ascending curve, from some 56% to 78% 


















Non-financial corporate indebtness rate in percentage of GOS (left
scale)
Non-financial indebtness rate as percentage of GDP (right scale)
 
Figure no. 1: Non financial corporate indebtness rate in euro zone as percentage of 
GOS and GDP (%) 
Source: Idem Table 10.  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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In Romania, the corporate debt versus gross operating surplus ratio followed a descending 
curve, from 166.2% in 1998 to 129.9% in 2006, and the debt / GDP ratio went down from 
38.7% in 1998 to 34.6% in 2006 (Table no. 5). 
In  household  debt,  the  comparison  between  Romania  and  various  European  countries 
reveals significant differences (Table no. 11). 
Table no. 11: Households indebtness rate (as % of gross disposable income) 
  1995  2003 
Netherlands  120.0  200.7 
United Kingdom  110.0  129.2 
Portugal  63.0  111.3 
Germany  92.0  104.5 
Spain  50.0  92.4 
Austria  63.0  75.1 
Belgium  58.0  63.5 
France  80.0  60.2 
Italy  23.0  36.4 
Romania*  2.1  8.7 
Source: Bank of France, 'Conturile naŃionale financiare 1998-2007', BNR, Bucharest, 2009. 
Note: *-1998 
In 2005, the share of household loans in the gross disposable income grew to 15.2%, and in 
2006 it stood at 22.7%. On the average, household loans versus gross disposable income 














Households indebtness ratio as percentage of gross disposable income (left
scale)
Interest rate (right scale)
Figure no. 2: Households indebtness ratio (as percentage of gross disposable income) 
and interest rate in euro zone (%) 
Source: Jöel Bourdin, Yvon Collin, 'Rapport d`information no. 342', Sénat France, 8 avril 
2009. AE  The Global Financial Crisis: Management of Deficits and Debts 
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These  trends  explain  somehow  the  upsurge  of  consumer  credit  offers  with  which  the 
banking sector tempted households in Romania in the period 2005 – 2008. The consumer’s 
purchasing power was stimulated and captured through credits offered mostly to encourage 
the development of a market of imported goods generally tendered by hypermarkets. This 
process  crippled,  sometimes  to  annihilation,  the  Romanian  manufacturers’  effort  to 
compete,  with  unequal  arms:  low  pay  for  the  workforce,  and  high  productivity 
requirements. 
The low salaries and high interest rate loans in Romania are the two levers that lead other 
foreign goods competitiveness against domestic production industries and exports. 
Another indicator that sets different scores between Romania and other European countries 
is the per capita average debt: in 2004, in thousand Euros, this was 39.8 in Denmark, 32.8 
in the Netherlands, 26.0 in the United Kingdom, 22.7 in Ireland, 19.7 in Sweden, 18.8 in 
Germany, 14.5 in Austria, 12.4 in Spain, 11.1 in France, 10.9 in Belgium, 10.3 in Portugal, 
6.6 in Italy, 4.7 in Greece, and only 175 Euros in Romania; in 2008, the Euro equivalent of 
household debt as a capita average grew to 2,516 Euros. 
At a first glance, this leaves the impression of a favourable trend in Romania, but when 
annual  salaries  are  compared  between  Romania  and  other  EU  member  states,  the 
impression changes. 
It is also worth remembering that interest rates in the Euro Zone has been a steady 2-3%, 
while in Romania the interest on Euro loans is at least twice as high, and on Lei loans is 
five times higher. Such rates are discriminatory for both corporate and individual clients, 
and force them into uncompetitiveness. 
As a rule, when profits rate are higher than the interest rate, a corporate entity can borrow; 
the rule operates in the Euro Zone, where the 'norm' is around 15% for dividends or profit 
versus some 3% in interest rates. 
It is not difficult to imagine what profitability a Romanian company should have to cope 
with the interest rates available to it in Romania, and it is a matter of common sense to see 
that  equal  treatment  in  respect  of  competitiveness  and  competition  policies  is  just  a 
beautiful theory. 
The economic growth stimulated by inflating a country’s debt after the creation of the Euro 
Zone triggered an increase of the money supply at a rate of 6-12% per year; concomitantly, 
marketable payment instruments (debt securities) grew in the Euro Zone by 15.7% in 2005, 
54.5% in 2006 and 60.2% in 2007. 
Financial markets 'inflate' the worth of the shares and of the capital, and salaries are traded 
on the stock exchange,  which leads to the relocation of the  manufacturing activities to 
other, low pay, countries, and to a 'recycling of profits' through financial engineering. This 
is how the price of labour and the price of capital, two decisive factors in any economy, are 
distorted. 
Against expectations, the trade surplus of the low pay countries determines the deficit of 
their trading partners; and yet, there is nothing surprising about these tendencies. They 
should  serve  as  lessons  of  business  competence  and  knowledge,  teaching  people  how 
certain economic theories and policies fail to stand the test of practice.  Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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It is an established truth that when interest rates drop, the stocks exchange value and the 
market  value  of  real  property  increase.  In  many  countries  these  two  values  have  been 
growing faster than the GDP. 
This enables both households and corporations to borrow more, even though, physically 
speaking, the stock of properties and buildings stays the same. A house mortgage will in 
this way permit borrowings increasingly higher than the usual income. 
Productivity, however, could not grow at a pace of more than 2 – 3% per year in the past 
few hundreds of years. Productivity is the result of knowledge and of rational choice, while 
the price of shares and the price of real property are the result of 'irrational exuberance'
2. 
The annual growth rate of the price of lodgings (Table no. 12) has nothing to do with either 
the growth of the GDP, or with the curve of productivity or household income, so as the 
price  of  the  shares  seems  to  have  no  relation  whatsoever  to  productivity,  the  GDP,  or 
household income, salaries included. 





2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Germany  -1.6  0.1  -1.9  -3.3  -2.0  -3.8  -2.0  -1.1  -0.6 
Spain  6.6  1.3  6.5  12.8  16.3  14.9  10.9  6.3  3.8 
France  7.1  0.1  6.0  6.2  9.3  12.5  13.2  10.1  6.8 
Italy  1.6  0.2  6.0  6.6  7.1  7.6  5.2  4.4  3.9 
Netherlan
ds 
-2.1  7.8  5.6  4.2  2.4  2.7  3.3  3.1  2.5 
Finland  8.6  -1.8  -3.5  8.4  4.5  6.0  5.1  8.5  7.3 
Denmark  -0.3  3.1  3.5  1.3  1.1  7.9  15.6  19.2  3.4 
United 
Kingdom 
6.8  1.1  6.9  14.6  14.5  10.3  3.5  3.8  8.3 
USA  0.9  0.3  5.0  5.2  4.5  7.7  9.3  5.6  1.2 
Source: Eurostat and OCDE data. 
It has been calculated that, on medium and long term, some 3 to 5% of the price growth of 
lodgings  reflects  each  year  in  an  increased  demand  for  all  sorts  of  goods  and  services 
(consumer goods and services, luxury cars, refrigerators, holiday making, etc.). 
Generally, deficit and debt are treated differently in countries backed by strong currencies. 
The deficit of the USA, for example, is other countries’ surplus; the issue for the USA is 
not so much the size of its deficit, but how the other countries use their dollar surplus. If 
such surplus is invested in buying bills of exchange, bonds, shares, etc. in the USA, then 
the money comes back home. 
The  surplus  realised  by  China  and  Japan  have  brought  the  exchange  rate  of  their  own 
currencies  to  a  standstill,  and  have  raised  the  value  of  the  dollar.  And  this  is  how 
protectionism becomes, 'unwittingly' a global practice, not so much by trade policies but by 
foreign exchange rates. 
                                                 
2 Alan Greenspan (2009): Era turbulenŃelor, Editura Publică, Bucure ti. AE  The Global Financial Crisis: Management of Deficits and Debts 
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Romania is far from commanding the necessary strength to join such global games, or at 
least  not  until  it  switches  to  the  Euro  Zone.  Nevertheless,  the  current  corporate  and 
household debts may become a source of future gain for credit lenders. 
If we only take the rise in the price of land as an example, further indebtedness seems to be 
a sure trend in the future. For example, the valuation of the market price of Romania’s 
agricultural land amounted to some 5.4 bn Euros in 1999, to soar then to 13.2 bn Euros in 
2005. 
The worth of lands within city bounds followed a tenfold increase from 2.2 bn euros in 
1999 to 20.6 bn euro in 2005. In the five years span of 2003-2008, according to estimations 
made by the Romanian Commercial Bank, the price of farm land has grown five more 
times, ranging now between 1,000 and 3,500 Euros per hectare. 
Despite which, the price of farm land in Romania is still much below the price of farm land 
in Ireland (60,000 euro/hectare) or on the neighbouring countries (7,000-8,000 euro/hectare 
in the Ukraine and Serbia). 
In  consideration  of  the  above,  our  view  is  that  the  real  property  market,  even  though 
temporarily frozen, may become an engine of economic growth, but also a future generator 
of  instability.  After  accession  to  the  Euro  Zone,  and  with  the  gradual  development  of 
infrastructure, the land price differentials between Romania and other EU member states 
will no longer justify. 
Generally,  however,  the  surplus  and  the  savings  in  the  emerging  countries  are  not 
consonant  with the domestic power of investment and capitalisation,  which is  why  the 
management  of  the  developed  countries’  debts  and  of  the  surplus  of  the  emerging 
economies is a challenge for the global financial system. 
The global financial balance and the international financial market should not be an aim per 
se, they should be carefully structured in order to enable mankind to make the most of the 
Globe’s resources.  
For Romania, it is of capital importance for her citizens to know on what they are spending 
their money, because it is one thing to spend their money to finance imports and consumer 
credits,  and  another  to  spend  it  to  develop,  maintain,  furnish  a  lodging,  innovation  to 
develop and manufacture new products. 
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